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Abstract
This article presents the confluence of two general ideas: Defeasible Logic Programming (DeLP, an argu-
mentation based formalism for representing knowledge and reasoning) and Abduction in logic. In first place,
we introduce a framework that formally states the problem of doing abduction (obtaining abductive explana-
tions) in the particular case that the abductive theory is a DeLP Program. In the reminder of this work we face
that problem, providing a formal characterization of the notion of abductive explanation, in such a way that we
could then easily calculate the explanations from this formal characterization. An important advantage of this
approach is that by proving the correctness of the characterization, we ensure the correctness of the method for
obtaining explanations.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In this work we will present the confluence of two general ideas. Firstly, Defeasible Logic Program-
ming (DeLP) is a formalism for representing knowledge and reasoning, that combines results of Logic
Programming and Defeasible Argumentation. This formalism will be briefly introduced in section 2.
Secondly, Abduction in logic represents a form of reasoning where, given a (logic) theory T and a
sentence G, we try to find a set of sentences Φ (abductive explanation for G) such that T ∪Φ ` G and
T ∪ Φ is consistent.
Here, we face the problem of doing abduction in the particular case that the abductive theory
is a (restricted) DeLP program P, and the sentence to be explained is a literal in the language of
P. In order to formally state the problem, in section 3 we introduce the notion of Abductive-DeLP
framework, and we present a notion of abductive explanation slightly adapted for that framework.
In particular, we will focus on the problem of obtaining abductive explanations (for a literal h in
an Abductive-DeLP framework AF ). The strategy adopted consists in providing a formal character-
ization of the notion of abductive explanation, in such a way that we could then easily calculate the
explanations from this formal characterization. An important advantage of this approach is that by
proving the correctness of the characterization (not done in this work for space reasons), we ensure
the correctness of the method for obtaining explanations.
The formal characterization of the notion of explanation involves two parts. From the definition of
abductive explanation, and considering the reasoning mechanism of DeLP, we know that the incorpo-
ration of an abductive explanation for a given literal to the abductive theory (DeLP program), causes
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the emergence or activation of new arguments (and possibly, the deactivation of existent ones), which
in turn causes the literal to be accepted. Then in section 4 we formalize which information should be
present in an explanation (and which should not) in order to activate a given argument. On the other
hand, in section 5 we formally state which arguments must the explanation activate and which must
not in order to effectively explain the acceptance of the literal. Finally, combining both, we will have
a formal characterization of the notion of abductive explanation.
2 DELP OVERVIEW
Defeasible Logic Programming (DeLP) combines results of Logic Programming and Defeasible Ar-
gumentation. The system is fully implemented and is available online [1]. A brief explanation is
included below (see [2]for full details). A DeLP program P is a set of facts, strict rules and defeasible
rules. Facts are ground literals representing atomic information or the negation of atomic information
using strong negation “∼” (e.g., chicken(little) or ∼scared(little)). Strict Rules represent non-
defeasible information and are denoted L0 ← L1, . . . , Ln, where L0 is a ground literal and {Li}i>0
is a set of ground literals (e.g., bird ← chicken or∼innocent ← guilty). Defeasible Rules repre-
sent tentative information and are denoted L0 —< L1, . . . , Ln, where L0 is a ground literal and {Li}i>0
is a set of ground literals (e.g., ∼flies —< chicken or flies —< chicken, scared).
When required, P is denoted (Π,∆) distinguishing the subset Π of facts and strict rules, and the
subset ∆ of defeasible rules (see Ex. 2.1). Strong negation is allowed in the head of rules, and hence
may be used to represent contradictory knowledge. From a program (Π,∆) contradictory literals
could be derived. Nevertheless, the set Π (which stands for non-defeasible information) must possess
certain internal coherence, i.e., no pair of contradictory literals can be derived from Π.
A defeasible rule is used to represent tentative information that may be used if nothing could be
posed against it. Observe that strict and defeasible rules are ground. However, following the usual
convention [3], some examples use “schematic rules” with variables.










flies(X) —< chicken(X), scared(X)
∼flies(X) —< chicken(X)

This program has three defeasible rules representing tentative information about the flying ability
of birds in general, and about regular chickens and scared ones. It also has a strict rule expressing
that every chicken is a bird, and three facts: ‘tina’ and ‘little’ are chickens, and ‘tina’ is scared.
Given a DeLP program P, a defeasible derivation for a literal L from P is a (tentative) proof for
L involving strict and defeasible rules in the program. The reason for using the term defeasible is that
it is possible to derive contradictory literals from P. For example, from (Π2.1,∆2.1) in Ex. 2.1 it is
possible to derive flies(tina) and ∼flies(tina).
For the treatment of contradictory knowledge DeLP incorporates a defeasible argumentation for-
malism. This formalism allows the identification of those pieces of knowledge that are in contradic-
tion, and a dialectical process is used for deciding which information prevails as warranted. This
dialectical process (see below) involves the construction and evaluation of arguments that either sup-
port or interfere with the query under analysis. As we will show next, arguments supporting the
answer for a given query will be shown in a particular way using dialectical trees. The definition
of dialectical tree will be included below, but first, we will give a brief explanation of other related
concepts (for the details see [2]).
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Definition 2.1 (Argument Structure). Let (Π,∆) be a DeLP program. . We will say that 〈A, α〉
is an argument structure (or just argument) for a literal α from (Π,∆), if A is the minimal set of
defeasible rules (A⊆∆), such that: (1) there exists a defeasible derivation for α from Π ∪ A, and (2)
the set Π ∪ A is non-contradictory.
Example 2.2. From the DeLP program (Π2.1,∆2.1) the following arguments can be obtained:
〈A1, f lies(tina)〉, where A1 = {flies(tina) —< bird(tina)}
〈A2,∼flies(tina)〉, where A2 = {∼flies(tina) —< chicken(tina)}
〈A3, f lies(tina)〉, where A3 = {flies(tina) —< chicken(tina), scared(tina)}
A literal L is warranted if there exists a non-defeated argument A supporting L. To establish if
〈A, α〉 is a non-defeated argument, defeaters for 〈A, α〉 are considered, i.e., counter-arguments that
by some criterion are preferred to 〈A, α〉. In DeLP, the comparison criterion is usually generalized
specificity, but in the examples given in this paper we will abstract away from this particular criterion,
since in this work it introduces unnecessary complications. Since defeaters are arguments, there
may exist defeaters for them, and defeaters for these defeaters, and so on. Thus, a sequence of
arguments called dialectical line is constructed, where each argument defeats its predecessor. In
order to avoid undesirable sequences that may represent circular or fallacious argumentation lines, in
DeLP a dialectical line is acceptable if it satisfies certain constraints (see [2]).
Example 2.3. From Ex. 2.2, we have that argument 〈A2,∼flies(tina)〉 defeats 〈A1, f lies(tina)〉,
argument 〈A3, f lies(tina)〉 is a defeater for 〈A2,∼flies(tina)〉, and the sequence of arguments
[〈A1, f lies(tina)〉, 〈A2,∼flies(tina)〉, 〈A3, f lies(tina)〉] is an acceptable argumentation line.
Clearly, there might be more than one defeater for a particular argument. Therefore, many ac-
ceptable argumentation lines could arise from a given argument, leading to a tree structure. Be-
fore defining the notion of dialectical tree, we need to introduce some terminology. Let Λ =
[〈A0, h0〉, 〈A1, h1〉, . . . , 〈An, hn〉] be an acceptable argumentation line, and 〈Bi, qi〉 be a defeater of
〈An, hn〉 such that Λ′ = [〈A0, h0〉, 〈A1, h1〉, . . . , 〈An, hn〉, 〈Bi, qi〉] is also acceptable. Then we will
say that 〈Bi, qi〉 extends Λ.
Definition 2.2 (Dialectical tree [2]). Let 〈A0, h0〉 be an argument from a program P. A dialectical
tree for 〈A0, h0〉 from P, denoted TP(〈A0, h0〉), is defined as follows:
(1) The root of the tree is labelled with 〈A0, h0〉.
(2) Let N be a node of the tree labelled 〈An, hn〉, and Λ = [〈A0, h0〉, 〈A1, h1〉, . . . , 〈An, hn〉] be the
(acceptable) argumentation line corresponding to the sequence of labels of the path from the root to
N . Let { 〈B1, q1〉, 〈B2, q2〉, . . ., 〈Bk, qk〉 } be the set of all arguments extending Λ. Then for each
argument 〈Bi, qi〉, the node N has a child Ni labelled 〈Bi, qi〉. If there exist no argument extending
Λ, then N is a leaf.
In a dialectical tree, every node (except the root) represents a defeater of its parent, and leaves
correspond to non-defeated arguments. Each path from the root to a leaf corresponds to a different
acceptable argumentation line. A dialectical tree provides a structure for considering all the possible
acceptable argumentation lines that can be generated for deciding whether an argument is ultimately
defeated. We call this tree dialectical because it represents an exhaustive dialectical analysis for the
argument in its root.
Given a literal h and an argument 〈A, h〉 from a program P, to decide whether a literal h is
warranted, every node in the dialectical tree TP(〈A, h〉) is recursively marked as “D” (defeated) or
“U” (undefeated), obtaining a marked dialectical tree T∗
P
(〈A, h〉) as follows:
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1. All leaves in T∗
P
(〈A, h〉) are marked as “U”s, and
2. Let N be an inner node of T∗
P
(〈A, h〉). Then N will be marked as “U” iff every child of N is
marked as “D”. The node N will be marked as “D” iff it has at least a child marked as “U”.
Given an argument 〈A, h〉 obtained from P, if the root of T∗
P
(〈A, h〉) is marked as “U”, then we
will say that T∗
P
(〈A, h〉) warrants h and that h is warranted from P (that will be noted P |∼
W
h).
In this paper, an argument 〈A, h〉 will be depicted as a triangle, whose upper vertex is labelled
with the conclusion h, and the set of defeasible rules A are associated with the triangle itself. Marked
dialectical trees will be depicted as shown in figure 1.
Figure 1: Dialectical trees for flies(tina).
Example 2.4. (Extends Ex. 2.3) Figure 1 shows the marked dialectical tree T∗
P 2.1
(〈A1, f〉) (the
leftmost tree), which has only one argumentation line. Observe that the argument 〈A2,∼f〉 in-
terferes with the warrant of ‘flies(tina)’ and the argument 〈A3, f〉 reinstates 〈A1, f〉. The root of
T∗
P 2.1
(〈A1, f〉) is marked as “U” and therefore the literal ‘flies(tina)’ is warranted.
3 ABDUCTIVE DELP FRAMEWORK
In this section we will introduce a framework for doing abduction in a (restricted) version of DeLP
without strict rules. Before, we need to introduce certain distinguished sets of literals associated with
any set of defeasible rules. Let ∆ be a set of defeasible rules. Then we will use all lits(∆) to denote
the set of all literals appearing in defeasible rules in ∆. Also, we will use head lits(∆) to denote the
set of all literals that are heads of defeasible rules in∆ (i.e., head lits(∆) = {H|H —< B1, B2, ..., Bn ∈
∆}). Finally, we will use body lits(∆) to denote the set of all literals that appear in the body of a
defeasible rule in ∆. (i.e., body lits(∆) = {Bi|H —< B1, ..., Bi, ..., Bn ∈ ∆}).
Definition 3.1 (A-DeLP Framework). An A-DeLP framework is a pair 〈Πf ∪∆, A〉 where
• Πf ∪∆, the theory, is a DeLP program without strict rules, ie. Πf is a consistent set of literals
(called facts) and ∆ is a set of defeasible rules.
• A is a set of distinguished literals in the language of Πf ∪∆, called abducibles, such that
body lits(∆)\(heads(∆) ∪ Πf ∪ Πf ) ⊆ A ⊆ (all lits(∆) ∪ all lits(∆))\(Πf ∪ Πf )
Given a literal Q, an abductive explanation for Q w.r.t. the abductive framework, is defined as a
set of abducibles Φ (Φ ⊆ A) such that:
• Πf ∪∆ ∪ Φ |∼W Q and
• Πf ∪ Φ is consistent.
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The set A associated with an A-DeLP framework constitutes the domain of the explanations in
that framework, i.e., A is the set of literals (abducibles) that can integrate the explanations. The set A
must be specified when defining the A-DeLP framework and it could be any set of literals satisfying
the restrictions stated by the previous definition. The election of a specific set of abducibles A depends
on the application domain.
The adjective abductive is used to distinguish explanations in the abductive sense from the notion
of explanation in the context of DeLP (or dialectical explanations), where dialectical trees constructed
to answer a query can be seen as explanations for the answer obtained. From now on, when we use
the term explanation we mean abductive explanation.
After introducing the elements for performing abduction in DeLP, we have to deal with the prob-
lem of obtaining explanations. In what follows, we will present a formal characterization of the notion
of abductive explanation, in such a way that we could then easily calculate the explanations from this
formal characterization.
4 CHARACTERIZING THE NOTION OF (POTENTIAL) ARGUMENT AC-
TIVATION
As we have seen in section 2, the (state of) warrant of a given literal w.r.t. a DeLP program depends on
the arguments that can be computed from that program. Then in order to consider a setΦ of abducibles
as an explanation of the warrant of a given literal, Φ must cause the activation of certain arguments
and, as we will see later, the non activation of others. In this section, we formally state the conditions
that a given set Φ of abducibles must satisfy in order to cause the activation of a certain argument.
More precisely, those conditions specify the presence of certain literals in Φ and the absence of others.
As we have seen in section 2, the notion of argument is defined with respect to a concrete DeLP
program. On the other hand, when performing abduction we work with an incomplete DeLP program,
trying to find a set of facts (more precisely abducibles) to complete the DeLP program in order to
warrant a given literal. Then the notion of argument we introduced in section 2 is not suitable in the
context of abduction, and consequently we need to introduce a notion of potential argument. For the
next definition, we will use L(AF ) to denote the language associated with AF .
Definition 4.1 (Potential Argument). Let AF = 〈Πf ∪∆, A〉 be an A-DeLP framework. Let
Q ∈ L(AF ). Let B ⊆ ∆. Then 〈〈B, Q〉〉 is a potential argument w.r.t. AF iff there exists a non
contradictory set of literals Ω ⊆ L(AF ) such that 〈B, Q〉 is an argument w.r.t. (Ω,∆).
Example 4.1. Consider an A-DeLP framework AF1 = 〈Π1f ∪∆1, A1〉, where:
Π1f = {b,∼g},
∆1 = {(a —< b, c), (c —< d, e), (f —< g), (g —< h)}
A1 = {c,∼c, d, e, h}
Then the following are potential arguments w.r.t. AF1:
〈〈{(a —< b, c), (c —< d, e)}, a〉〉 (assuming for example Ω = {b, d, e})
〈〈{(a —< b, c)}, a〉〉 (assuming for example Ω = {b, c})
〈〈∅, g〉〉 (assuming for example Ω = {g})
On the other hand, 〈〈{(a —< b, c), (f —< g)}, a〉〉 is not a potential argument w.r.t. AF , since
〈{(a —< b, c), (f —< g)}, a〉 will not be an argument w.r.t. (Ω,∆1), for any Ω considered. Note that
the defeasible rule f —< g will never be necessary to defeasibly derive a, violating the minimality
condition in the definition of argument.
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The following definition formally introduces the notion of (potential) argument activation, that
was informally used at the beginning of this section.
Definition 4.2 (Potential Argument Activation). Let AF =〈Πf ∪∆, A〉 be an A-DeLP framework.
Let 〈〈B, Q〉〉 be a potential argument w.r.t. AF and let Φ ⊆ A. We say that 〈〈B, Q〉〉 is activated
by Φ in AF (or alternatively that Φ activates 〈〈B, Q〉〉) iff Φ 0⊥ and 〈B, Q〉 is an argument w.r.t.
(Πf ∪ Φ,∆).
Example 4.2. Consider the A-DeLP framework AF1 of example 4.1. Let 〈〈B, a〉〉 be a potential
argument w.r.t. AF1, whereB={(a —< b, c), (c —< d, e)}. The set of abducibles Φ1 = {d, e, h} activates
〈〈B, a〉〉, because 〈B, a〉 is an argument w.r.t. (Π1f ∪ Φ1,∆1). As can be seen in figure 2a, Φ1 completes
Π1f with those additional facts needed to defeasibly derive a (using rules in B). Furthermore, it
can be noted that the abducible h ∈ Φ1 does not contribute to the activation of 〈〈B, a〉〉. Note that
Φ2 = Φ1 \ {h} = {d, e} also activates 〈〈B, a〉〉.
On the other hand, the set Φ3 = {d} does not activate 〈〈B, a〉〉 (see figure 2b). Note that e does
not belong to Π1f ∪ Φ3, and it is necessary to defeasibly derive a.
The set Φ4 = {d, e,∼c} does also not activate 〈〈B, a〉〉 (see figure 2c), this time because Φ4 incor-
porates a fact (∼c) that contradicts an intermediate conclusion of 〈〈B, a〉〉, violating the consistency
condition in the definition of argument.
Another interesting case is Φ5 = {d, e, c}, which does not activate 〈〈B, a〉〉 (see figure 2d). Note
that Φ5 incorporates c, which coincides with the head of c —< d, e, one of the rules in B. In such
case, c —< d, e is unnecessary for deriving a, because as c is a fact, we can directly introduce it in
the derivation. So B is not minimal for deriving a, and then violates the minimality condition of the
definition of argument. Now, consider the potential argument 〈〈C, a〉〉, where C = {a —< b, c} (i.e., C
is B without c —< d, e). Then it holds that Φ5 effectively activates 〈〈C, a〉〉 (see figure 2e).
The set Φ6 = {e} activates the empty potential argument 〈〈∅, e〉〉. In general, any set of abducibles
Φ containing a literal Q activates the empty potential argument 〈〈∅, Q〉〉.
Finally, consider the potential argument 〈〈D, f〉〉, where D = {(f —< g), (g —< h)}, and let Φ7 =
{h}. Then Φ7 does not activate 〈〈D, f〉〉 because of an inconsistency involving an intermediate con-
clusion and a fact (as previously showed with Φ4 and 〈〈B, a〉〉), but this time, the fact causing the
inconsistency, ∼g, belongs to Π1f (see figure 2f). So, there exists no set of abducibles activating
〈〈D, f〉〉.
Next, we will introduce a property which states certain necessary and sufficient conditions for a
potential argument 〈〈B, Q〉〉 to be activated by a set of abducibles Φ. More precisely, the property
states which literals must Φ contain (and which must not) in order to activate 〈〈B, Q〉〉. Before intro-
ducing the property, we need to define two distinguished sets of literals associated with any potential
argument.
Definition 4.3. Let 〈〈B, Q〉〉 be a potential argument. We define two sets of literals associated with
〈〈B, Q〉〉:
• heads(〈〈B, Q〉〉) =def head lits(B)
• base(〈〈B, Q〉〉) =def
{ {Q}, if B= ∅;
all lits(B) \ head lits(B), otherwise.
The reason for using of the term base becomes evident when considering the graphical represen-
tation we adopted for potential arguments in figure 4.2. That is, as a triangle with the conclusion on
the top, and expliciting inside the defeasible rules conforming it chained in a top-down derivation.
The following example, and the figures associated with it, illustrates what we are saying.
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Figure 2: Potential Argument Activation
Example 4.3. Consider the A-DeLP framework AF1 of example 4.1. Let 〈〈B, a〉〉 be the poten-
tial argument of example 4.2 (B={(a —< b, c), (c —< d, e)}). Then heads(〈〈B, a〉〉) = {a, c} and
base(〈〈B, a〉〉) = {b, d, e} (see figure 3a). Consider the empty potential argument 〈〈∅, c〉〉. Then
heads(〈〈∅, c〉〉) = ∅ and base(〈〈∅, c〉〉) = {c} (see figure 3b).
Property 4.1. Let AF =〈Πf ∪∆, A〉 be an A-DeLP framework. Let 〈〈B, Q〉〉 be a potential argument
w.r.t. AF and let Φ ⊆ A. Then Φ activates 〈〈B, Q〉〉 iff Φ 0⊥ and the following conditions hold:
• base(〈〈B, Q〉〉) ⊆ Πf ∪ Φ
• heads(〈〈B, Q〉〉) ∩(Πf ∪ Φ) = ∅
• heads(〈〈B, Q〉〉) ∩ (Πf ∪ Φ) = ∅
It can easily be verified that the property holds for each case considered in example 4.2. In
particular, consider the potential argument 〈〈D, f〉〉 defined in example 4.2 (D= {(f —< e), (e —< g)}).
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〈〈B, a〉〉 〈〈∅, c〉〉
(a) (b)
Figure 3: base and heads sets of a potential argument.
As we concluded before, there exists no set of abducibles activating 〈〈D, f〉〉. In fact, note that g ∈
heads〈〈D, f〉〉 and ∼g ∈ Π1f , and then the second condition in the previous property is violated
independently of the set Φ of abducibles considered.
As we have already shown in the previous examples, given an A-DeLP framework, there may
exist potential arguments that could not be activated in such framework. That is the same to say, as
we have just seen, that they violate at least one of the three conditions of property 4.1, for any set
Φ of abducibles considered. So, given an A-DeLP framework, we could ignore such non activable
potential argument, concentrating only on the others, that we will call activable potential arguments.
Next, we will formally define the notion of activable potential argument.
Definition 4.4 (Activable Potential Argument). Let AF =〈Πf ∪∆, A〉 be an A-DeLP framework.
Let 〈〈B, Q〉〉 be a potential argument w.r.t. AF . We say that 〈〈B, Q〉〉 is activable in AF iff there exists
a subset Φ of A such that Φ activates 〈〈B, Q〉〉.
Now that we have formally defined the notion of activable potential argument, we will present,
through the next property, a more practical (directly implementable) characterization of that notion.
More precisely, it states the restrictions that must satisfy a given potential argument, in terms of it´s
base and heads sets, in order to be activable.
Property 4.2. Let AF =〈Πf ∪∆, A〉 be an A-DeLP framework. Let 〈〈B, Q〉〉 be a potential argu-
ment w.r.t. AF . Then 〈〈B, Q〉〉 is activable in AF (noted as 〈〈B, Q〉〉+) iff it satisfies the following
conditions:
• base(〈〈B, Q〉〉) ⊆ Πf ∪ A
• heads(〈〈B, Q〉〉) ∩ Πf = ∅
• heads(〈〈B, Q〉〉) ∩ Πf = ∅
Consider the three arguments that appear in example 4.2. Note that the potential argument 〈〈D, f〉〉
(D = {(f —< e), (e —< g)}), which was identified as non-activable, violates indeed the third condition
of this property. The other two, 〈〈B, a〉〉 (B={(a —< b, c), (c —< d, e)}) and 〈〈C, a〉〉, (C = {a —< b, c}),
are activable (see figures 2a and 2e respectively) and then as it can be easily verified, they both satisfy
the three conditions of the property.
Finally, we will present a new version of property 4.1, specific for activable potential arguments.
Property 4.3. Let AF =〈Πf ∪∆, A〉 be an A-DeLP framework. Let 〈〈B, Q〉〉+ be an activable po-
tential argument w.r.t. AF and let Φ ⊆ A. Then Φ activates 〈〈B, Q〉〉+ iff Φ 0⊥ and the following
conditions are satisfied:
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• base(〈〈B, Q〉〉+) \ Πf ⊆ Φ
• heads(〈〈B, Q〉〉+) ∩ Φ = ∅
• heads(〈〈B, Q〉〉+) ∩ Φ = ∅
5 CHARACTERIZING WARRANT EXPLANATIONS
As we have said in section 3, our purpose is to provide a formal characterization of the notion of
abductive explanation, in such a way that we could then easily calculate the explanations from this
formal characterization. In the previous section, we presented partially this characterization, focusing
only on the conditions under which a given set Φ of abducibles activates a given (activable) potential
argument. In this section we will complete the characterization. More specifically, we will provide
a logical formalization in First Order Logic that captures the notion of which (activable) potential
arguments must a given set Φ of abducibles activate, and which must not, in order to explain the
warrant of a given literal h.
As a first step, we will define a specific notation for denoting nodes in a dialectical tree. At first
sight, it seems that to univocally identify a certain node it is sufficient to name the argument labelling
it. But that is wrong because two nodes in a dialectical tree could be labelled with the same argument.
An effective way of identifying a node is making reference not only to the argument labelling it, but
also to the argumentation line conformed by the (arguments labelling the) ancestors of the node in the
tree.
Consider a dialectical tree T(〈A, h〉), let N be a node of T(〈A, h〉) labeled with 〈B, k〉 and let
L be the argumentation line corresponding to the path from the root of T(〈A, h〉) to the father of N
inclusively. Then we will use 〈B, k〉L, read as 〈B, k〉 with ancestors line L, to refer to the node N
(see figure 4a). Additionally, let L = [〈A1, h1〉, 〈A2, h2〉, ..., 〈An, hn〉] be an arbitrary argumenta-
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Notation for nodes in a dialectical tree.
tion line, and let 〈B, k〉 be an argument. Then will use L : 〈B, k〉 to denote the argumentation line
[〈A1, h1〉, 〈A2, h2〉, ..., 〈An, hn〉, 〈B, k〉], that results from adding 〈B, k〉 at the end of L. Finally, if
〈B, k〉L denotes a node and it has a child labeled with 〈C, j〉, then combining both notations intro-
duced, we can use 〈C, j〉L:〈B,k〉 to denote the child node (see figure 4b).
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Next we will present the analysis that lead us to the first logic formula. Let AF = 〈P, A〉 be an
A-DeLP framework, let Φ ⊆ A be a consistent set of abducibles and let h be a literal. Then from
the definition of warrant presented in Section 2 and from our previous discussion we can state the
following:
h will be warranted w.r.t. the DeLP program P ∪ Φ (1)
iff
there exist an argument 〈A, h〉 in P ∪ Φ (2)
and
T(P ∪ Φ)(〈A, h〉), the dialectical tree for 〈A, h〉, has its root undefeated.
But the statement (1) is the same to say that Φ will be an explanation for the warrant of h. Also,
the statement (2) is in turn the same to say that there exist an activable potential argument 〈〈A, h〉〉+
in AF such that Φ activates 〈〈A, h〉〉+. By rephrasing statements (1) and (2) into the equivalent
formulation given before, we can define the notion of explanation as follows:
Φ will be an explanation for the warrant of h iff there exists an activable potential argument
〈〈A, h〉〉+ in AF such that Φ activates 〈〈A, h〉〉+ and T(P ∪ Φ)(〈A, h〉) has its root undefeated.
Let PotArgs+AF be the set of all activable potential arguments w.r.t. AF . Then the previous
sentence is captured by the following formula:
exp warrant(Φ, h) =def
∨
〈〈A,h〉〉+∈ PotArgs+AF act(Φ, 〈〈A, h〉〉
+) ∧ U(Φ, 〈A, h〉[ ]) (α)
Now, consider an argument 〈A, h〉 w.r.t. P ∪ Φ, let T(P ∪ Φ)(〈A, h〉) be the dialectical tree for
〈A, h〉 and let 〈N, k〉L be a node of T(P ∪ Φ)(〈A, h〉). Then according to the criterion used for marking
a dialectical tree (section 2), we can say that:
〈N, k〉L will be defeated iff there exists a child 〈M, q〉L:〈N,k〉 of 〈N, k〉L (3)
such that 〈M, q〉L:〈N,k〉 is undefeated.
But, by definition of dialectical tree, the node 〈N, k〉L has a child 〈M, q〉L:〈N,k〉 iff there exists an
argument 〈M, q〉w.r.t. P∪Φwhich extends the argumentation line L : 〈N, k〉. Moreover, that is equiv-
alent to say that Φ activates some potential argument 〈〈M, q〉〉+ w.r.t. AF which extends L : 〈N, k〉.
Below is the statement that results from transcribing (3) according to de last analysis:
〈N, k〉L will be defeated iff there exists an activable potential argument 〈〈M, q〉〉+ w.r.t. AF which
extends L : 〈N, k〉 such that Φ activates 〈〈M, q〉〉+ and 〈M, q〉L:〈N,k〉 is undefeated.
OBSERVATION: We could restrict 〈〈M, q〉〉+ to be a non-empty argument without changing the
meaning of the sentence. The reason is that if M = ∅, we can ensure that 〈〈M, q〉〉+ will not be
activated by Φ 1.
Let L be an argumentation line. We will use PotArgsExt+AF (L) to denote the set of all non-empty
activable potential arguments w.r.t. AF which extend L. Then the previous sentence is captured by
the following formula:
D(Φ, 〈N, k〉L) =def
∨
〈〈M,q〉〉+∈ PotArgsExt+AF (L:〈N,k〉) act(Φ, 〈〈M, q〉〉
+) ∧ U(Φ, 〈M, q〉L:〈N,k〉) (β)
Making a similar analysis, but this time for the undefeated status of a node in a dialectical tree,
we reach to the following sentence:
1Note that since 〈N, k〉 is an argument w.r.t. P ∪ Φ, by consistency condition of the definition of argument, we know
that there is no strong information (in P∪Φ) contradicting 〈N, k〉, which in turn implies that there exist no empty argument
〈∅, q〉 in P ∪ Φ contradicting 〈N, k〉.
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〈N, k〉L will be defeated iff for all (non empty) activable potential argument 〈〈M, q〉〉+ w.r.t. AF
which extends L : 〈N, k〉, it holds that either Φ does not activate 〈〈M, q〉〉+ or
Φ does activate 〈〈M, q〉〉+ and also 〈M, q〉L:〈N,k〉 is defeated.
The next formula captures the meaning of the previous sentence:
U(Φ, 〈N, k〉L) =def (γ)∧
〈〈M,q〉〉+∈PotArgsExt+AF (L:〈N,k〉) ¬act(Φ, 〈〈M, q〉〉
+) ∨(act(Φ, 〈〈M, q〉〉+) ∧ D(Φ, 〈M, q〉L:〈N,k〉))
Finally, we will present an example illustrating how the previous formulas can be used.
Example 5.1. Consider an A-DeLP framework AF2 = 〈Π2f ∪∆2, A2〉, where
Π2f = {e, b}
∆2 = {(a —< b, c), (∼a —< d), (∼a —< g), (d —< e), (g —< c), (∼d —< e, f)}
A2 = {c,∼d, f,∼g}
Next, we list all the (non empty) activable potential arguments w.r.t. AF2:
〈〈A1, a〉〉+, where A1 = {a —< b, c} 〈〈A3,∼d〉〉+, where A3 = {∼d —< e, f}
〈〈A2,∼a〉〉+, where A2 = {(∼a —< d), (d —< e)} 〈〈A4,∼a〉〉+, where A4 = {(∼a —< g), (g —< c)}
Suppose we want to explain the warrant of a in AF2. Then we need first to instantiate (and
generate) the parametric formula (α) for AF2 and taking h as a. The instantiated formula follows:
exp warrant(Φ, a) = act(Φ, 〈〈A1, a〉〉+) ∧ U(Φ, 〈A1, a〉[ ])
But the atom U(Φ, 〈A1, a〉[ ]) in the previous instantiated formula denotes also an entire formula,
that could be obtained instantiating (γ). The resulting instantiated formula follows next:
U(Φ, 〈A1, a〉[ ]) = ¬act(Φ, 〈〈A2,∼a〉〉+) ∨
(





act(Φ, 〈〈A4,∼a〉〉+) ∧ D(Φ, 〈A4,∼a〉[〈A1,a〉])
)
Now two new atoms have been introduced, this time denoting formulas that can be obtained in-
stantiating formula (β). We keep on doing that until no more atoms are introduced. The remaining
instantiated formulae follows next:
D(Φ, 〈A2,∼a〉[〈A1,a〉]) = act(Φ, 〈〈A3,∼d〉〉+) ∧ U(Φ, 〈A3,∼d〉[〈A1,a〉,〈A2,∼a〉])
D(Φ, 〈A4,∼a〉[〈A1,a〉]) = false
U(Φ, 〈A3,∼d〉[〈A1,a〉,〈A2,∼a〉]) = true
Finally, starting form the instantiated formula for exp warrant(Φ, a) and substituting each D
and U atom by its definition, we obtain the following formula, in which only act/1 atoms occur:






That formula clearly specifies which activable potential arguments must Φ activate and which
must not in order to be an explanation for the warrant of a. Let´s analyze what is concretely saying.
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Note that the ∨ in the formula reflect alternative restrictions. In fact, the formula describes two alter-
native situations on which Φ constitutes an explanation for a. One is that Φ activates 〈〈A1, a〉〉+ and
does not activate 〈〈A2,∼a〉〉+ nor 〈〈A4,∼a〉〉+. The other is that Φ activates 〈〈A1, a〉〉+, 〈〈A2,∼a〉〉+
and 〈〈A3,∼d〉〉+ and does not activate 〈〈A4,∼a〉〉+. The dialectical trees warranting a associated to
each alternative are shown in figures 5a and 5b.
(a) (b)
Figure 5: Alternative dialectical trees warranting a.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this article, we presented the confluence of two general ideas: Defeasible Logic Programming and
Abduction in logic. Concretely, we introduced a framework that formally states the problem of doing
abduction (obtaining abductive explanations) in the particular case that the abductive theory is a DeLP
Program. In the reminder of this work, we faced that problem, providing a formal characterization
of the notion of abductive explanation, from which we could then easily calculate the explanations.
That characterization was presented in two parts. On the one hand, we formally stated the conditions
that must satisfy an explanation in order to activate a given argument. On the other hand, we formally
stated which arguments must an explanation activate and which must not in order to effectively explain
the warrant of a literal.
As future work, we will develop a procedure for efficiently calculating the explanations. That pro-
cedure will be tightly based on the formal characterization presented here. Then as we have outlined
in this article, by proving the correctness of the characterization, we cold ensure the correctness of
the procedure.
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